Monday, August 22, 2016

Re-examining the roots of the stray dog menace


By Rahul V Kumar*


The Problem

With the number of stray dog attacks increasing in Kerala, the major debate has been whether or not to eliminate these animals from the street. Animal rights activists vociferously challenge all plans to kill dogs. A humane way is suggested; to sterilize dogs and thereby control the population. There is another group which considers that the government’s lax attitude towards waste disposal has resulted in the menace. They suggest new methods in waste management. A third group considers empowering local area governance structures to deal with the problem. All these are indeed valid points and have been important to analyse the stray dog menace in Kerala. However, the issue of stray dog menace has significant roots in the changes taking place in Kerala’s social and economic features. These changes also indicate significant institutional deficits in accommodating new policies.

A Hypothesis

The main reason for sudden spurt of stray dogs can indeed be traced back to our inefficient waste management measures. It would be but naive to consider that all waste leads to the rise of the dog population. A better hypothesis is that specific waste particles might be contributing towards this phenomenon. A notable feature in Kerala today is the significant shift in the eating habits of individuals. Consumers prefer more meat and chicken in their diet than other food substitutes. This is also reflected in the rise of a large number of poultry farms and fast food joints serving chicken and meat products. The reason for such a shift in the eating habits could be because chicken and meat products have become cheaper and more affordable in real terms to the population in Kerala. More affordability of cheap food sources has created a demand for these items, and the market has come forward to satiate it. The problem of rising stray dog population could directly be traced to the negative externalities generated by these farms and food joints. Much of these externalities are created due to improper disposal of waste from these enterprises.

What this means and what we should do

What this indicates is that there are rapid changes occurring in the lifestyle and food habits of the population in Kerala. However, there are very few parallel institutional changes in the society that could accommodate the evolving patterns. Rules that develop in the management of such units (as the farms and food outlets) are still in the evolutionary stages as our local and state governments seem to have never anticipated these changes. As can be easily predicted government response to the stray dog menace would be to create new departments and organizations that would thrive on this market requirement. However, that in itself would only worsen the situation than cure it. A learning lesson for the state of Kerala is to look back on why our poultry diet has substituted earlier dietary habits. As we presume this could largely be because of faulty agricultural policies that inflated prices several times during the last few decades making substitutes appear affordable.
So do we blame each other or do we find a solution to the problem? There are no clear solutions at this moment, but there is a cue that we could take from such events to prevent similar catastrophes in future. An indicative trend in such events is poor economic understanding of the society in which we leave. In an era where changes occur at a very fast pace, our governments cannot afford to have an iron hand in policy making. A liberal environment would allow for the creation of new institutions which could accommodate such changes. It is high time that the society is made free to develop such institutions.

*The Author is Research Consultant at Centre for Public Policy Research. Views are personal and does not represent that of CPPR

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

The Case of Taxing the Poor Burger in Kerala




By Rahul V Kumar*
There could be several reasons why a 14.5 per cent fat tax on a burger and related products (sandwiches, pastas, doughnuts, pizzas etc)[1] was imposed by the new Left government in Kerala. High on that list could be the possible projection by the media that the government is concerned with the health of its citizens. Given that individuals in Kerala are well aware of the various health concerns as well as emerging issues (fed by innumerable awareness campaigns, health magazines, as well as television programmes in which they directly interact with doctors) a tax on burger seems a tad too stretched to meet the goal of better health. Considering these speculations the government seems to have categorised the tax under the head of revenue generation. However, the implied notion of a tax to promote health looms large over this budgeted move. The question is does taxing to reduce consumption serve the purpose of improving health? It seems to resonate with the high taxes on alcohol which has not proven to reduce consumption. As in the case of alcohol such taxes could also be indicative of a ban on junk food in the near term.  It is very unlikely that individuals in Kerala are unaware of the health consequences of ‘junk’ food. The probability that the choice of ‘junk’ was an informed consent between the producers and the consumers seems very high. If individuals have thus chosen ‘junk’ over ‘non-junk’, it indicates that the market has strengthened in response to demand. This is same as the case where there are increasing numbers of outlets serving organic food items. Left to its own the market will signal individual choices more freely than when controlled thorough restrictive taxes. The consequences of such artificial restrictions could prove costly.
There are initially some definitional concerns in taxing selected food products. How do we define and tax a group of ingredients which are categorized as a ‘burger’ or ‘pizza’ or ‘pasta’? Suppose tomorrow these ingredients are modified to retain much of its similarities but with a change in name and form does it still stand taxing? The problem is that there are innumerable variants in which these ingredients can be assembled essentially retaining its taste. The question is: Is the burger ‘junk’ or is it the combination of ingredients that make it ‘junk’? So do we tax the burger or the ingredients which cause fat? It is only a matter of reassembling these ingredients before the market is able to retain the old habits. That said the question of what constitutes junk also needs to be re-examined. Selective taxation of food which entered our culture from outside might indicate intolerance of other cultures. Consider for instance our growing eating styles and habits in Kerala. There has been large increase in the number of small vendors serving fried snacks across the state. Individuals can be seen crowding such joints in the evenings and enjoying their share of these products. This is also due to various reasons; women working, difficulty to manage maids, inflation of the food ingredients higher to the food products etc. All these products irrespective of what they constitute are high in unhealthy fats and cholesterol. If health is a concern these eateries also stands questioned. Such small vendors are significant drivers of the market for food and food products and any restrictions on them are likely to influence demand generation in the economy. Long term effects of such policies can be examined through Bihar’s case where tax has been levied on samosas and sweets.[2] The case of a fat tax in Denmark and the ‘metabo’ law in Japan run parallel to such policies. Denmark was forced to abandon fat tax within a year of its introduction.[3]
An obvious consequence of the tax would be an increase in price of products served in the growing food industry sector in Kerala. There is an issue with the tax on basmati rice, pizza, burger and wheat products at the same time. It is unlikely that the government intends to do as it covers all the food items available in the market except our own rice. At the same time, there is an increase of tax for coconut oil that will lead to the price rise in the food served at restaurants again. In addition this could also shift usage from coconut oil to other edible oil available in the market.  Awareness and the availability of the data on the ingredients front in the so called junk food is one of the solutions rather imposing a partial ban through higher taxes. Let the data be out as in the case of Mac, KFC and Burger King. There are also questions that remain unaddressed and needs further investigation. How do we define saturated and unsaturated fat and to what percentage? Who and how we will decide the content to tax. It is like good cholesterol and bad cholesterol. Especially in Kerala, how will it affect the middle class and upper middle class who consume these? Will they be affected by this rise? What happens to the beef and other ingredients which could also be a fat source?
Obesity is a major health issue which is a concern for most developed nations. Several countries have adopted reforms and measures to decrease instances of obesity. A possible explanation in most of these reforms has been to transfer the onus to the private sector to sponsoring healthcare.[4] However, transferring healthcare cost to the private sector through taxes does not simultaneously reduce the role of the government in this sector. If health is the major concern the government ought to liberalize the sector and allow for competition to prevail. Insurance coverage could be enhanced; health vouchers could be issued; and foreign investments could be liberalized for the sector and so on. These factors could take our health status to higher levels. A tax is more likely to disrupt a growing food industry than creating a necessary safeguard for the health of citizens.

*The Author is Research Consultant at Centre for Public Policy Research. Views are personal and does not represent that of CPPR

Thursday, June 30, 2016

Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections 2016: Continuity of party and practices




By Sambhavi Ganesh*

For a federal unit belonging to a country characterized by a prolonged national movement and the subsequent Congress dominated scenario, Tamil Nadu has surprisingly escaped the national electoral trends by and large. Since 1967, the main political parties operating in Tamil Nadu have been offering an alternative Dravidian ideology in response to the Hindi-Hindu-Hindustani mobilization of much of the rest of India, diversifying the political processes of the country to a significant degree. This article attempts to understand the results of the 2016 Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu by exploring reasons for the ADMK’s victory, the DMK’s loss, and some general factors that bring a party to power in the state. 

Anti-incumbency rule takes a hit
The state has been characterized by a constant swing between All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK/ADMK) and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) governments since 1989. Exit polls had largely predicted a DMK victory.[1] Contrary to the predictions, the ADMK returned to power with 134 seats out of 232 and the DMK alliance trailed with 98 seats. The ADMK has not come to power with such low vote share (40.8%) since 1977. Its vote share to power has been over 50% since 1984.
Predictions were made in favour of the DMK owing to the anti-incumbency factor. However, this was not to happen because of four reasons. Firstly, despite being criticized as populist, Jayalalithaa’s social welfare schemes provided household goods and marriage assistance and had ensured the support of women. According to the CSDS Lokniti survey, female voters cutting across all social and economic indicators were supportive of the ADMK victory, more so than in previous elections.[2] Secondly, the promise of free mobile phones, free 100 units of electricity and subsidized two wheelers/mopeds have made a difference in the anti-incumbency trend of Tamil Nadu. The condition of high voter turnouts resulting in anti-incumbency has been proved wrong; about 3/4th of the electorate turned up to vote. Thirdly, the anger of the public due to the apparent lack of action and propagandist relief measures during the November 2015 floods has hardly shown any effect in the areas not affected by the flood. Moreover, the asset charges against her have been a seemingly insignificant case compared to the DMK’s 2G scam to the electorate. Hence, the predictions widely varied from the reality.

The DMK dynasty
Some significant reasons for the DMK’s loss seem to stem from the party leadership (and ex-leadership). According to news reports, MK Stalin, son of DMK chief Karunanidhi, had conducted a ‘spirited campaign’ critiquing the inaccessibility of the incumbent CM Jayalalithaa. He replaced the traditional political attire of dhoti, white shirt, and a shawl with trousers, t-shirts, and sports shoes. Almost a year-long public outreach program has led to a positive image of the party, especially in his constituency of Kolathur.[3] However, since his name had not been announced for the CM’s post, many have avoided voting for the DMK. (CSDS Lokniti pre-poll survey) Alagiri, another son of Karunanidhi, was dismissed from the DMK in 2014 owing to rivalry with Stalin. He has since then been making statements against the DMK, even claiming neutrality in the 2016 Assembly elections. His workers have allegedly been working to make the party loses power in the Madurai belt, a region considered to be his bastion. Despite performing well in the 2016 elections in the rest of Tamil Nadu (39.7% vote share), the DMK has suffered in Madurai (35.225%) due to Alagiri’s ouster.

The dharma of coalitions
A characteristic feature of victorious parties in the Tamil Nadu assembly elections are coalitions: ADMK’s coalition with Congress, PMK, CPM and CPI in 2001 and DMK’s coalition with the same parties in 2006 had ensured their respective victories. In 2011, ADMK could form a government without a coalition, and hence it broke off its alliance with the DMDK (Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam) post elections. In 2016, the ADMK contested in 227 seats out of 234, distributing the rest of the seats to allies who contested under the two leaves symbol of the ADMK. The ADMK’s vote share was 40.8% in 232 constituencies[4]. The DMK alliance had gained 39.7% of the votes; however, the DMK’s vote share in the 176 seats that it contested was 41.05%, slightly more than the ADMK’s performance. Allies have been a significant cause of reducing the DMK alliance’s vote share – the Congress won only 8 of the 41 seats that it contested. According to surveys, even traditional Congress supporters did not vote for the DMK-Congress alliance. DMK allying with other smaller parties might have resulted in a different electoral outcome. [5]
The People’s Welfare Front (PWF), a coalition of DMDK (led by actor-politician Vijayakanth), CPI, CPI (M), and VCK (a Dalit party) aimed to form a strong to the Dravidian parties. DMDK’s victory in 29 seats out of 41 in 2011 made no effect in this election as the alliance failed to win even one seat. Lack of funds has been a leading cause attributed to the loss; while other contestants spent Rs 5-10 crores in each constituency, the PWF contestants couldn’t spend more than Rs 40 lakhs.[6] The election commission does not allow more than Rs 28 lakh to be spent by a candidate for assembly elections, which brings us to the issue of cash-for-votes.[7]

Cash for votes
After the resounding DMK win in 2009 by-poll in Thirumangalam (Madurai district), there were widespread allegations of the party buying votes for cash. Each voter was supposedly given five thousand rupees through newspapers and milk delivery systems, forcing many to receive money. The ‘Thirumangalam model’ of cash for votes has since then gained much notoriety among the Election Commission. In 2016, more than 100 crores of unaccounted money was seized, which was believed to be meant for distribution among the public. In Aravakurichi and East Thanjavur constituencies alone, the Election Commission seized large sums of cash a few days before the elections. Hence, elections have not been conducted in those constituencies as of June 2016.

Casting the vote or voting the caste?
Parties like Puthiya Tamizhagam (PT), Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) (both are SC welfare parties) and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK – an OBC-Vanniyar[8] interest based party) failed to win a single seat in 2016. Voters appear to have avoided caste-based parties openly and instead opted for the Dravidian parties (ADMK and DMK) which express a pan-Tamil identity. However, the Dravidian parties are not caste-neutral – candidates fielded in a constituency mostly belong to the dominant caste of that region, thereby splitting the votes of the caste. Moreover, many important positions in the DMK and ADMK are filled by dominant OBC castes (including Vanniyars); some token positions are given for Dalits.[9] Violence against Dalits is continually silenced to keep the OBC vote banks intact.[10] Hence, the Dravidian parties themselves work under caste influence. Ironically, they brand the PMK (accused of inciting violence against Dalits), PT and VCK (Dalit parties) together as playing caste-based politics. The caste factor in Tamil Nadu’s politics is rarely brought to the limelight because of the assumption that an anti-Brahmin movement before independence has driven caste identities underground. However, this is not the reality. 

Conclusion
It is true that Tamil Nadu has largely bucked the national trend in terms of the party system. However, what binds the political processes of Tamil Nadu to the Indian state’s processes is the concealed but important role of caste and community in elections. Additionally, large scale cash distribution takes place during campaigns. The cash and caste model of mobilization have resulted in the hegemony of the Dravidian parties. Hence, stable subaltern formations or even alternative governments have become a remote possibility in the state.

*Sambhavi Ganesh is a intern at CPPR. The views expressed by the author is personal. 

Featured image source: india.com

[1] Narasimhan, TE. 16th May 2016. ‘Exit polls in Tamil Nadu favour DMK.’ Business Standard <http://www.business-standard.com/article/elections/exit-polls-in-tamil-nadu-favours-dmk-116051601025_1.html>
[2] Verma and Ramajayam. 24th May 2016. ‘Lokniti-CSDS Post-poll Analysis: Women bought Jaya her return ticket’. The New Indian Express. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jayalalithaa-aiadmk-dmk-tamil-nadu-assembly-elections-2016-results2815867/
[3] PTI. 19th May 2016. ‘Stalins spirited campaign makes it a close contest in TN’. India Today. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/stalins-spirited-campaign-makes-it-a-close-contest-in-tn/1/672125.html
[4] Elections were actually conducted only in 232 constituencies because of the confiscation of cash in two constituencies, Aravakurichi and East Thanjavur.
[5] Soloman. 24th May 2016. ‘CSDS Lokniti Post-poll Survey: DMK needed broader alliance to consolidate anti-AIADMK vote’. The New Indian Express. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/karunanidhi-dmk-jayalalithaa-aiadmk-tamil-nadu-assembly-elections-2016-results-2816021/
[6] Gorringe and Karthikeyan. 2016. ‘Anti-Caste Politics and the Tamil Nadu Elections: A Lost Opportunity to Deepen Democracy.’ The Wire. http://thewire.in/38255/anti-caste-politics-and-the-tamil-nadu-elections-a-lost-opportunity-to-deepen-democracy/#disqus_thread
[7] Kumar, Devesh. 19th February 2014.’ Poll panel raises expenditure limit for Lok Sabha campaign by 30 lakhs’. NDTV. http://www.ndtv.com/elections-news/poll-panel-raises-expenditure-limit-for-lok-sabha-campaign-by-30-lakhs-551288
[8]  Vanniyars are an OBC caste group concentrated in north Tamil Nadu. They comprise 25% of Tamil Nadu’s population.
[9] Gorringe and Karthikeyan. Op. Cit. ‘Anti-Caste Politics ...’ The Wire
[10] Scheduled Castes make up 20% of the population, while OBCs constitute 68% of the population of Tamil Nadu.